This paper quantifies the impact of public employment on local labor markets in the long-run. We follow two different quantitative approaches that we apply to the case of Spanish cities. In the first one, we develop a 3-sector (public, tradable and non-tradable) search and matching model embedded within a spatial equilibrium model. We characterize the steady state of the model which we then calibrate to match the labor market characteristics of the average Spanish city. Then, we use the model to simulate the local labor market effects of expanding public sector employment. In the second empirical approach, we use regression analysis to estimate the effects of public sector job expansions on decadal changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) in the employment and population of Spanish cities. This analysis exploits the dramatic expansion of public employment that followed the advent of democracy in the 1980-2001 period. The instrumental variables' approach that we follow uses the capital status of cities to instrument for changes in public sector employment. The two empirical approaches yield qualitatively similar results and, thus, crosscheck each other. One public sector job creates about 1.3 additional jobs in the private sector. However, these new jobs do not translate into a substantial reduction of the local unemployment rate as better labor market conditions attract new workers to the city. Increasing public employment by 50% only reduces unemployment from 0.156 to 0.150.
Introduction
Public employment constitutes a significant fraction of employment. In 2013, the share of public employment in total employment was, on average, 21% in OECD countries 1 . Hence, policies regarding public sector wages and employment are likely to influence the labor market. The objective of this study is to estimate the long-run labor market effects of public employment at the city-level.
There is evidence from different countries indicating that governments use public employment as a policy tool to affect local labor market performance. Specifically, governments use the distribution of public employment within its geography as a means to reduce spatial economic inequalities. In 1992, up to 400,000 jobs in public works cushioned the raise in unemployment that followed the re-unification in Eastern Germany (Kraus et al., 1998) . In Spain, jobs in public works also exist in rural and lagging areas as a means to increase local disposable income (JofreMonseny, 2014) . In Sweden, the creation of universities in less prosperous cities has been part of the country's regional policy to reduce regional economic disparities (Andersson, 2005) . In
England, 25,000 public sector jobs were relocated away from London between 2004 and 2010.
Among other objectives, the policy aimed at stimulating economic activity in less prosperous areas (Faggio and Overman, 2014) . Less explicitly, interregional income redistribution is partly achieved through a higher concentration of public sector jobs in the south both in Italy (Alesina et al., 2001 ) and in Spain (Marqués-Sevillano and Rosselló-Villallonga, 2004) . Focusing on risk sharing between Norwegian regions, Borge and Matsen (2004) show that public employment is a prominent force that counterbalances local economic shocks.
More public employees in a city will increase the demand for local services such as housing, restaurants or hair-dressers, crowding-in private employment. However, this effect can be offset by increases in local wages and prices that might follow the public employment expansion. This crowding-out effect can be particularly acute in the tradable sector since local workers do not significantly affect the demand of locally produced manufactures. In addition, local job creation can increase in-migration rates that might also weaken the link between more jobs in the local economy and a lower unemployment rate of its residents.
To quantify the long-run local labor market effects of public employment, we follow two different quantitative approaches that we apply to the case of Spanish cities. In the first one, we calibrate and simulate a search and matching model with geographically mobile workers. In the second one, we resort to regression analysis. The two empirical approaches yield qualitatively similar results and, thus, cross-check each other.
We first develop a 3-sector (public, tradable and non-tradable) search and matching model à la Diamond (1982 )-Mortensen (1982 )-Pissarides (1985 . The model assumes that (homogeneous) workers only search while being unemployed and accept any job offered. Moreover, 1 OECD (2015).
unemployed workers can move at zero cost. It is assumed that each city is sufficiently small, implying that there is a fixed reservation utility for the unemployed. Workers consume all their income in a tradable good, a non-tradable good and land. The latter two prices are endogenous and clear their respective markets while the price of the tradable good is exogenous and determined at the national (or international) market. Due to geographical mobility, a city whose labor market prospects improve is a city that must become more expensive to live-in. Vacancies and wages in the public sector are exogenously determined while, in the private sector, free-entry implies that firms in the tradable and non-tradable sectors open vacancies until its expected value becomes zero.
We characterize the steady state of the model which we then calibrate to match the labor market characteristics of the average Spanish city. Then, we use the model to simulate the local labor market effects of expanding public sector employment. The geographical mobility of workers implies that the labor force in the city increases with a public sector job expansion. In the non-tradable sector, the wage increase caused by the policy is clearly offset by the raise of the local demand for the non-tradable good and employment in this sector increases substantially. In contrast, the demand for the locally produced tradable good remains unaffected. As a result, the effect on tradable employment is small and is determined by two opposing forces:
higher wages on the one hand decrease employment while agglomeration economies, that increase productivity, increase employment. In our baseline calibration, one additional public sector job increases private jobs by 1.3 and the workforce by 2.6. As a result, large expansions in public employment have modest impacts on the local unemployment rate. Increasing public employment by 50% only reduces the unemployment rate from 0.156 to 0.149.
In the second empirical approach, we use regression analysis to estimate the effects of public sector job expansions on decadal changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) in the employment and population of Spanish cities. This analysis exploits the dramatic increase in public employment that followed the advent of democracy that followed Franco's death. Between 1980 and public employment grew by 133%, increasing from 1.4 to 3.2 million jobs. We start by analyzing the determinants of this public sector job expansion across cities. Two important results emerge.
First, more public sector jobs are created in cities experiencing negative labor demand shocks, providing further evidence that public employment is used by governments to reduce spatial income inequalities. Second, provincial capitals (established in 1833) experienced a more than proportionate increase in public employment between 1980 and 2001. Specifically, being a capital city implied an additional 1.6 public sector jobs each decade per each 100 inhabitants in the base year. This result is the basis for our Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) strategy which consists in using the capital status of cities to instrument for changes in public sector employment. As for instrument validity, several robustness checks support the maintained assumption that (conditional on initial unemployment, education, location -coast versus inland cities-and size) the capital status of a city is uncorrelated to shocks in employment and population growth.
The TSLS estimates also indicate that one additional public sector job increases private jobs by about 1.3 and the labor force by 2.7 individuals. The reduced-form estimates obtained imply that increasing public employment by 50% only reduces the unemployment rate from 0.156 to 0.150.
There are, at least, three factors that can rationalize the relatively large multipliers that we find. First, in the period that we study , interregional migration rates in Spain have been relatively low but, in contrast, intraregional migration rates have been substantial (Bover and Arellano, 2001 ). Specifically, cities have kept attracting migrants from the rural areas within their region and more public sector jobs in capital cities might have intensified this process. Second, the model simulations indicate that the land supply elasticity is key to determine if, and the extent to which, public employment crowds-in or crowds-out private employment. The complier cities in our TSLS regressions are relatively small provincial capitals which can be deemed as cities with a rather elastic land supply. Finally, our model also indicates that multipliers will be larger when public sector wages are high. In Spain, the public sector wage gap is substantial (Hospido and Moral-Benito, 2014) , and this is especially true in small provincial capitals given that the distribution of public sector wages is more compressed than that of the private sector.
The paper that is closer to ours is Faggio and Overman (2014) [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , the results suggests that, if anything, public employment crowds-out rather than crowds-in private employment. As already recognized by Faggio and Overman (2014) , the highly restrictive planning system prevalent in England (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2015) implies a very inelastic land (and housing) supply which could explain the absence of significant crowding-in effects on private employment in that country. We complement Faggio and Overman (2014) study in several ways. First, we estimate the local labor market effects of public employment in Spanish cities.
For the reasons detailed above, these estimates can be policy-relevant in settings with unrestrictive planning systems and/or with favorable geography for urban development. Second, we study a time period in which the Spanish public sector developed, with massive and geographically heterogeneous increases in public employment. While in the period studied by Faggio and Overman (2014) , public employment increased by less than 6% in England, in our setting the increase was of 133%. Third, we develop a search and matching model with geographical mobility that clarifies the mechanisms through which public employment affects cities and quantifies their relative importance. Finally, another attractive feature of our study is the novel TSLS strategy that we use. Instead of using a Bartik (1991) shift-share instrument that uses employment in the base year to predict subsequent employment growth, we use a city feature (the capital status of a city) which dates back to 1833 to predict public employment growth in the 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 decades. Since we document that more public jobs are created in cities experiencing negative labor demand shocks, building a shift-share instrument with the 1980 and 1990 distribution of public employment could be problematic as these distributions could reflect past labor demand shocks that are likely to be correlated over time.
Instead of analyzing the local labor market effects of public employment, Moretti (2010) and Moretti and Thulin (2013) estimate the local multipliers of jobs in the tradable sector in the US and Sweden, respectively. Their results indicate that, on average, one additional job in the tradable sector creates about 1.6 and 0.5 jobs in the non-tradable sector in the typical US and Swedish city, respectively. Our results are, thus, in between these two estimates but closer to the US multipliers. Beaudry et al. (2012) , Kline and Moretti (2013) embed standard search and matching models à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides in spatial equilibrium models (Roback, 1982) 2 . Beaudry et al. (2012) set-up a multi-sector and multi-city model with labor market frictions. The empirics of the paper, that examine changes in wages and employment across cities and industries in the US, indicate that a positive labor demand shock in one sector increases wages in the rest of industries in the city, providing empirical support for labor market frictions and bargaining. In turn, Kline and Moretti (2013) deal with the efficiency of place-based policies in the presence of geographical mobility and labor market frictions. In relation to these studies, we go a step forward by calibrating the model and using it to simulate the effects of a local labor market policy. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so in the context of search and matching models with geographical mobility.
Finally, our paper also relates to a recent strand of the macro literature studying the labor market effects of public employment in national economies. Burdett (2012) , Gomes (2015a) and Bradley et al. (2015) use search and matching models to analyze the effects of public sector wages and employment on labor market performance 3 . The conclusions reached by these studies are much more negative regarding the effects of public employment than those obtained by the present study. Algan et al. (2002) also study the effects of public employment at the national level using regression analysis applied to a long country-level OECD panel. Their results also suggest strong crowding-out effects. Specifically, they indicate that one public job crowds-out 1.5 private sector jobs and increases the number of unemployed by 0.3 individuals. Our study differs from this literature by estimating the effects at the city (rather than at the national) level.
Two facts can reconcile our results with those of this literature. First, labor mobility across cities 2 Another related study is Wrede (2015) that extends the urban economics literature on quality of life measurement by considering the presence of unemployment. 3 Quadrini and Trigari (2007) and Gomes (2015b) are instead concerned with the effect of public employment on the volatility of labor market outcomes.
implies that labor supply is much more elastic at the city than at the national level. In fact, in our search and matching model, if we consider the case with no geographical mobility, public employment also crowds-out private employment. Second, at the city level, the public wage bill is not financed through local taxes as it is typically financed by some upper-tier government.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the theoretical model. Section 3 presents the calibration of the model (3.1) and the main results of the model simulations (3.2). Section 4 contains the regression analysis. We describe the data and variables (4.1) before providing the institutional background and analyzing the city-level determinants of the public sector job expansion (4.2). Then, we turn to a descriptive (OLS) analysis of the effects of public employment on the city's private employment and population (4.3) before proceeding to the main TSLS analysis (4.4). The effects of public employment on the local unemployment rate are addressed in section 4.5 and, finally, section 5 concludes.
The model
In this section we develop a search and matching model à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides embedded within a spatial equilibrium model following Beaudry et al. (2012) and Kline and Moretti (2013) . Homogeneous workers can be employed or unemployed. Employees can be either in the public sector (g ), in the tradable sector (t ) or in the non-tradable sector (n). Workers consume all their income in a tradable good, a non-tradable good and land. Unemployed workers can leave the city at no cost.
Employment and unemployment
Unemployed workers search for jobs in the three sectors simultaneously and enjoy the nonlabor income b. We assume that the public sector is frictionless and job vacancies are instantaneously filled. We assume that the public sector wage bill is not financed through local taxation since the lion's share of this expenditure is financed by central and regional governments. We further assume that the public sector job creation rate ( f g ), separation rate (s g ) and wage (w g ), are all exogenously determined. In the private sector, jobs are filled via a constant returns to higher the number of vacancies with respect to the number of unemployed workers, the easier it is to find a job, f (θ) > 0, and the more difficult it is to fill a vacancy, q (θ) < 0. 
Firms in the tradable and non-tradable sectors will open vacancies until the expected value of vacancies becomes zero. Thus, the free entry condition in these two sectors are:
Workers
Each worker consumes a tradable and a non-tradable good, and land. Hence, a worker's utility in a city depends on nominal income, y = {b, w g , w t , w n } as well as on the city's prices of the nontradable good (p n ) and land (p c ) 7 . We assume that workers have a Cobb-Douglas utility function
, defining P as the city's price index 8 .
The parameters φ and δ reflect workers' preferences for the non-tradable good and land, respectively, being also the income shares spent on these two goods. The values for unemployment (U ) and employment in the public (W g ), tradable (W t ) and non-tradable (W n ) sectors are given by the following expressions:
We assume that unemployed individuals can move to another city at zero cost, implying that the utility of unemployed workers is equalized across cities. Since we assume that each city is small relative to the whole economy, the value of unemployment is fixed at z. Alternatively, if one considers intraregional migrations between the city and its hinterland, z would be the utility 7 Note that we do not consider non-participation in the labor market. As the regression results in section 4 show, the results do not indicate that public employment in a city increases labor force participation. 8 In our model, more public employees in the city do not increase the provision of local public goods and services and, thus, do not increase city amenities. We take this modeling approach because, as will become clear below, public employees in capital cities provide public goods and services (administrative services, universities or hospitals) that clearly not only benefit city residents.
level achieved in the city's hinterland.
Taking equations 8 and 12 imply that, in equilibrium, if the labor market prospects of a city improve (high wages, high job finding rates and/or low job separation rates), then the city must become a more expensive place to live-in (higher price index).
The next assumption is that wages in the tradable and non-tradable sectors are set through Nash bargaining. The Nash solution is the wage that maximizes the weighted product of the worker's and firm's net return from the job match. The first-order condition from this maximization problem is 9 :
1
where the parameter β represents the worker's bargaining power.
To fully characterize the dynamics of this economy, we need to define the law of motion for the unemployment rate (u), and for the employment rates in the public (e g ), tradable (e t ) and non-tradable (e n ) sectors. These evolve according to the following differential equations:
e g + e t + e n + u = 1.
Notice that the levels of unemployment and employment in the public, tradable and non- 9 The derivation of equations 13 and 14 are presented in Appendix A.
tradable sectors are uL, e g L, e t L and e n L, respectively.
In order to close the model, the markets for the non-tradable good and land must clear. The non-tradable good must be purchased by local workers.
φ(w g e g + w t e t + w n e n + b u) = p n e n .
Finally, we assume that land rents accrue to absentee land owners and, following Combes et al. (2012), we assume that land price is increasing with city size according to:
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the system of equations can be reduced to the following twelve key equations that characterize the behavior of the endogenous variables θ,
and u:
e g + e t + e n + u = 1,
φ(w g e g + w t e t + w n e n + b u) = p n e n ,
Equations 22 
Calibration and simulated results of the model

Calibration
We calibrate the model to match the labor market characteristics of the average Spanish city with transition rates defined at quarterly frequencies. Table 1 summarizes all the calibrated parameters and presents the steady state values of the endogenous variables. The real interest rate is fixed at r = 0.012, which is consistent with an annual interest rate of 4.8%. We target the 2001 city averages in terms of the unemployment rate (15.6%) and the employment rates 10 The derivation of equations 24 and 25 are provided in Appendix B. 11 If there is no public employment ( f g = s g = 0), the wage equations reduce to their standard form (Pissarides (2000) , page 18). Specifically,
in the public sector (20.9%), the tradable sector (15.8%) and the non-tradable sector (47.7%).
Using the Spanish Labor Force Survey (SLFS) and adopting the methodology applied in Silva and Vázquez-Grenno (2013), we calculate the separation rates in the three sectors considered.
While the separation rate in the public sector is s g = 0.009, in the tradable and non-tradable sectors these rates are higher and virtually identical with s t = s n = 0.015. Combining the job separation rates, the employment rates and the unemployment rate withė g =ė t =ė n =u = 0 delivers the job finding rates f g = 0.012, f t = 0.015 and f n = 0.046.
Since we do not observe vacant jobs, to calibrate the model, we assume that the fraction of job vacancies in each of the two private sectors (Ω i ) is given by the observed employment shares. Thus, we set Ω t = 0.249 and Ω n = 0.751. This implies that the aggregate job finding rate in the private sector is f = f t + f n = 0.061. We normalize the labor market tightness to one, θ = 1. Once Ω n , u and θ are known, we obtain the vacancy rates for the tradable and nontradable sectors using Ω n = v n v t +v n and θ = v t +v n u . We obtain v t = 0.039 and v n = 0.117 and, thus, v = v t + v n = 0.156. Finally, the vacancy filling rate is
Petrongolo (2001) identify the matching function elasticity parameter in the 0.5-0.7 range. We take 0.6 as reference and, thus, we set χ = 0.6. Given that we know job finding rates and θ, we can then use f = m o θ 1−χ to obtain the matching function scale parameter m o = 0.061.
As for wages, we normalize the wage in the public sector to one (w g = 1). Following Hospido and Moral-Benito (2014), we target a wage gap of 20% between the public and private sectors.
Similarly, we estimate the wage gap between the tradable and the non-tradable sector using the Spanish Continuous Sample Lives in 2005 (Muestra continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL). We find a gap of 11.9% after controlling by individual characteristics (age, age square, gender and education), leaving us with w t = 0.913 and w n = 0.807.
According to Eurostat, labor productivity in the Spanish tradable sector was 45.7% higher than personnel costs 12 . Thus, we set labor productivity at A t (L) = w t * 1.457 = 1.331. Regarding agglomeration economies, Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Rosenthal and Strange (2008) find an elasticity of (total factor) productivity with respect to density to be around 4-5% 13 . One concern with these studies is that highly-skilled workers are positively selected into the largest cities, over-estimating the effect of city size on productivity (Combes and Gobillon, 2015) . Thus, we set this elasticity at 3%, i.e. ζ = 0.03. We normalize the labor force to one (L = 1) which implies
given equation 33 and p c = 1 given equation 32. We assume that η, the elasticity of the land price with respect to city size, is 0.72 as has been recently estimated by Combes et al. (2012) .
The last two parameters that are determined by data are the income shares spent in the nontradable good and land. For the former share, we use data from the Household Budget Survey 12 2008-2010 average from Eurostat -Structural Business Statistics. 13 The studies quantifying the effect of (log) density on (log) productivity (or wages) typically include, as a regressor, the city's land surface. Hence, the elasticity of density is also the elasticity of city size.
0.6 14 . In order to know the income share spent on land, we will multiply the income share of housing expenditures by the share of land in housing values. We set the first quantity at 0.293 which is slightly larger than the values reported for the US by Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011) and for France by Combes et al. (2012) 15 . The second quantity, the share of land in housing values, is directly available from the BBVA capital stock series. This quantity follows the Spanish housing boom and bust. We take 0.233, the average value for the pre-boom period 1995-1998, which is very close to the same quantities reported by Albouy (2009) and Combes et al. (2012) for the US and French economies, respectively. The product of these two quantities is very close to 7% and, thus, we set δ = 0.07. The income share spent on tradable goods is then obtained as 1 − φ − δ which amounts to 0.33. Increasing public employment in a city implies a higher demand for the non-tradable good.
Simulated results
However, expanding public employment with well paid jobs will increase local private wages and, thus, employment in the non-tradable sector might either increase or decrease. The simulations indicate that the demand effect clearly dominates the wage effect. Specifically, one public sector job creates between 1.2 to 1.3 jobs in the non-tradable sector. In contrast, public employees do not raise the demand for locally produced tradable goods. As a result, the effect on tradable employment is smaller and is determined by two opposing forces, higher wages on the one hand decrease employment while agglomeration economies increase employment. In this sector, the simulations imply multipliers that are either positive but very small (0. negative (-0.054 to -0.012).
Table 2 also indicates that more public jobs in the city increase the size of its labor force.
The effects are substantial. An additional public job increases the city's labor force by 2.4 to 2.7 workers. A larger city increases the price of land as well as the price for the non-tradable good.
This higher cost-of-living (the price index P ) offsets the better labor market prospects. The population inflow weakens the link between more jobs and a lower unemployment rate in the city.
For instance, increasing public employment by 50% only reduces the unemployment rate from 0.156 to 0.149. Similarly, focusing on employment rates instead of employment levels, one becomes less positive about the local labor market effects of public employment. If we focus on the 50% public employment increase scenario, the share of workers employed in the private sector actually decreases. While the employment rate in the non-tradable sector increases very little (by 0.004), the employment rate in the tradable sector decreases by 0.034 which is very close to 0.038, the increase in the employment rate in the public sector. The same picture arises if one examines the job finding rates. In the tradable sector, it decreases from 0.015 to 0.012 while in the non-tradable sector it increases from 0.046 to 0.048. The same pattern arises with the vacancy rate (the sum of vacancy rates in the tradable and non-tradable sectors) which decreases more than the unemployment rate and, as a consequence, the labor market tightness actually falls.
Alternative simulations of the model
In this section we present the model simulations in two alternative scenarios. First, we consider the model without geographic mobility. Second, we study the relationship between the multipliers' size and the magnitude of the public wage gap.
The model without labor mobility
We consider the model with fixed city size (L = 1), which implies that the productivity in the tradable sector and the price of land are fixed. Since there is no mobility, it is no longer true that rU = z. In terms of the equations that characterize the equilibrium, we drop equations 30, 32 and 33 16 . Table 3 shows the simulated results with an increase in the public job creation rate from 0.012 to 0.020 (50 % increase in the level of public employment). In stark contrast with the case with geographic mobility considered above, public employment clearly crowds-out private employment. While one extra job in the public sector destroys about 0.9 jobs in the tradable sector, it only creates 0.1 jobs in the non-tradable sector. As discussed above, the tradable sector is more negatively affected than the non-tradable as more public employees do not increase the demand for locally produced tradable goods. Since one public sector job destroys less than one job in the private sector, unemployment is reduced, going down from 0.156 to 0.139 percent. In this scenario, the link between more public sector jobs and less unemployment is not weakened by the inflow of workers but by the destruction of private sector jobs. Considering a closed economy brings the results of the simulations much closer to the macroeconomics literature analyzing the effects of public employment in (national) labor markets (Burdett (2012) , Gomes (2015a) , Bradley et al. (2015) and Algan et al. (2002) ).
These simulations shows that whether public employment crowds-in or crowds-out private employment depends crucially on the extent to which city size increases following a public employment expansion. In fact, even if workers are mobile, public employment can not trigger a workers' inflow if land supply is very inelastic, which results in public employment crowding-out private jobs. Indeed, the simulations (not reported here for the sake of space) indicate that the elasticity of land price with respect to city size (η), together with the income share spent on land (δ), are the key parameters that govern whether (and the extent to which) public employment crowds-in or crowds-out private employment. 16 As shown in Appendix B, the wage equations are obtained without using the condition rU = z.
Multipliers' sizes and the public wage premium
We simulate two alternative scenarios that differ in the size of the wage gap between the public and the private sectors. In each scenario, we recalibrate the model keeping unchanged the rest of targets and simulate the effect of increasing public employment by 50%. First, we decrease the public wage gap to 10% while, later, we increase it to 30%. The baseline scenario (Table 2, row 2) is reproduced here in the second row for the sake of comparability, and corresponds to a public sector wage gap of 20%. Table 4 shows the simulated results. Note: Multipliers are calculated as the employment or labor force change divided by the employment increase in the public sector.
The simulations indicate that higher public sector wages increase the positive multiplier effects of public employment. Increasing the public wage gap from 10% to 30% increase the estimated employment multipliers from -0.2 to 0.1 in the tradable sector, and from 0.9 to 1.5 in the non-tradable sector. Similarly, the labor force multiplier increases from 1.9 to 3. This result is consistent with the findings reported in Moretti (2010) and Moretti and Thulin (2013) . Specifically, they find multipliers from the tradable to the non-tradable sector that are especially large when the jobs in the tradable sector command high wages. Here, too, the effects of public employment on private employment are quite sensitive to the public sector wage gap.
Reduced-form estimates: Evidence from the late development of the Spanish public sector: 1980-2001
In this section, using regression analysis, we estimate the city-level effects of public sector job expansions. To that end, we exploit the uneven geography of the substantial increase in public sector employment that took place in Spain with the advent of democracy in the period 1980-2001. Since we are interested in the long-run effects of public employment (changes between steady states in terms of the model developed above), we will examine decadal changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) in the employment and population of Spanish cities. This exercise enables us to assess the degree to which the simulated results of the model match carefully estimated reduced-form coefficients. This section is organized as follows. After describing the data and variables used in the analysis, we provide a description of the geography of the public sector jobs expansions. Then, we report Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates before turning to the main instrumental variables' analysis that uses the capital status of a city as an instrument for local public sector employment growth.
Data and variables
We primarily use Census data on employment and population. As for employment, the data are Our public sector definition includes three industries: public administration (that includes police and the military), education and health. There are workers in the education and health sectors that are not public employees. Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to break down between private and public employees within these two activities. Having this caveat in mind, we include the education and health sectors in our definition of the public sector for two reasons. First, because the majority of these workers are directly employed by governments (67 and 61% of the workers in 1999 in education and health, respectively 19 ). Second, because there are many public services in education and health that, being partly financed by the public sector, are provided by private firms. The most prominent instance is that of primary and secondary education where the teachers' salaries in the majority of private schools (the so-called Educación concertada) are paid by regional governments. Similar arrangements also exist in the health sector.
Total employment is the sum of employees in the public sector (E g ), the tradable sector (E t ) and the non-tradable sector (E n ) 20 . We assimilate the tradable sector to the manufacturing in- 17 The same definitions are used in De la Roca and Puga (2013) . 18 We do not consider Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves in North-Africa. 19 This figures have been computed with the first term Labor Force Survey of 1999 20 We do not consider agriculture, farming and mining activities as they have been covered differently in different dustries, while non-tradable employment contains the workers in private activities that produce goods that can not be traded and includes the construction sector 21 . Our model also predicts that public sector expansions increase city size. Thus, we also consider (changes in) the citylevel (economically) active population, working age population and total population. Since in the model developed above all individuals are active in the labor market, the city size measure used there L corresponds more closely to active population.
In the regression analysis, we will examine decadal (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) increases in the employment and population measures detailed above measured relative to the city population in the base year (1980 or 1990) . The first two panels of Table 5 provide summary statistics for employment and population levels in 1980 and 2001 at the city level. The third panel reports summary statistics for the outcome variables that we will examine below, namely, pooled emCensuses. 21 Business services are clearly tradable goods. However, the 2-digit industry classification that is available to us does not often allow us to separate business vs. personal services within an industry code ployment and population decadal changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) relative to the population level at the decade's beginning. Starting with total population, the city average increased by 11.5% between 1980 and 2001.
Since the sample is fixed over time (N=83), 11.5 is also the growth rate of the entire urban population in Spain. This figure exceeds 8.6%, the population growth experienced by Spain as a whole during this period, and indicates that the share of the population living in urban areas increased between 1980 and 2001. This higher growth experienced by cities is explained mostly by intraregional migrations from rural areas to cities (Bover and Arellano (2001) and Jofre-Monseny which reveals that in Spain, small cities have grown more than large cities. In fact, mean reversion in population growth is a prevalent feature of our city-level data and one that needs to be taken into account in the regression analysis. The economically active population has grown far more (73%) in Spanish cities during this period as women entered the labor force massively 22 .
Similarly, (urban) employment increased by 86% between 1980 and 2001. This increase has not been uniform across economic sectors as the economy experienced a process of tertiarization with the employment in the tradable sector growing by only 6.6% between 1980 and 2001.
The geography of the public sector employment expansion
In Spain, the development of the public sector took place surprisingly late. In the urban areas that we study, the increase in public sector jobs was slightly smaller than that recorded in Spain as a whole (123 versus 133%). This, coupled with the higher population growth of the urban areas, implies that public sector employment has grown disproportionately more in the non-urban areas of Spain. More generally, this figure corroborates that being a capital comes along with public employees, and the difference is especially large for small cities. Holding population size constant, the presence of public employment is similar in provincial and regional capitals. This suggests that the process of regional decentralization that took place in Spain between 1981 and 2001 was not accompanied by a significant shift in public employment from provincial to regional capitals.
On the contrary, pre-democratic provincial capitals kept their status quo in terms of public employment. On the one hand, provincial institutions (Diputaciones being the more prominent one) persisted into democratic Spain. On the other hand, provincial capitals managed to pull regional government public jobs. In light of this, we will only consider two types of cities: capitals (regardless of them being provincial or regional) and non-capitals. There are 52 capital cities (50 provincial capitals in addition to Santiago de Compostela and Mérida) and 31 non-capital cities. Figure 1 shows capital cities (in red) and non-capital cities (in blue) within Spain. in capital and non-capital cities. It shows that when the public sector employment grew after the advent of democracy, this growth was more pronounced in capital cities, the differences being particulary large in small cities. The first row in Table 7 Table 7 shows that the over-representation of public employment in capital cities, both in 2001 levels as well as in 1980-2001 changes, occurs in public administration but also in the education and health sectors, as institutions like universities and hospitals also tend to concentrate in capital cities. We now turn to a more systematic analysis of the city-level determinants of the public sector Source: Census and own elaboration.
where the left-hand side variable is the decadal increase in public sector jobs (1980-1990 or 1990-2001) relative to the population level in the base year (1980 or 1990) 27 . In turn, α t is a set of time dummies while C api t al is an indicator variable for capital cities. Finally, z contains some control variables that we will consider in some specifications. The results are reported in Table   8 .
The first column shows the results with no other control variables than time dummies. These estimates indicate that, in the period 1980-2001, being a capital implied an additional 0.7 public workers each decade per each 100 inhabitants in the city in the base year. In the second column,
we also consider population growth as a control variable despite its endogenous nature (public sector jobs might increase population as the model developed above predicts). When doing so, the capital effect increases, implying that being a capital comes with 1.1 extra public jobs for each 100 inhabitants each decade. To assess the relative magnitude of this effect, note that the population growth coefficient (0.036) indicates that an increase of 100 residents is associated with an increase in 3.6 public sector workers. As explained above, there is ample evidence from different countries indicating public employment is used to offset local labor demand shocks.
To test if this has also been the case in our application, in the last specification (column 3), we include a Bartik (1991) shift-share variable that captures demand driven private employment changes in city i :
where E p stands for private employment (the sum of tradable and non-tradable workers), h indexes the (2-digit) industries within the private sector while i is the city index. The predicted employment change in 35 captures the component of the 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 local employment shock explained by the city's industry mix in the base year (1980 or 1990) interacted with the decadal (1980-1990 or 1990-2001) fate of industries at the national level. The results indicate that for each job lost due to a demand shock in a city, the public sector has created 0.194 jobs in the public sector in that city. This provides direct evidence that public employment has been used as a prominent policy instrument to offset local economic shocks. Note that these policy responses are important since they will bias downwards the OLS estimates in the regressions (to which we now turn) that estimate the effect of public employment on local private employment. As for the capital variable, the results of this last specification are slightly larger, implying that capital cities gained 1.6 additional public sector jobs per decade per each 100 hundred jobs in the period 1980-2001.
Public employment multipliers: OLS estimates
We now turn to the main analysis, namely, the estimation of public sector employment multipliers. Specifically, we estimate the impact of (decadal) changes in public employment on contemporaneous changes in measures of employment and population. All employment and population changes are divided by the city's population level at the beginning of the decade. We run variants of the following specification.
where Y stands for tradable, non-tradable and total employment, and active, working age, and total population. In addition to the change in public employment (E g ), the specification includes time dummies (µ t ), a vector containing control variables (x t ) and the error term (ζ t ).
The results are reported in Table 9 where each row shows the effect a public sector job increase on a different outcome. The first column show the results of specifications that only include the time dummies as controls. In the second column, we also include the unemployment rate and the share of college graduates measured at the beginning of the decade. Some of the cities in our sample are fast-growing coastal cities associated with tourism such as Torrevieja, Costa del Sol or Tenerife Sur. Thus, in the third column we also include the share of vacation homes in 1991 as well as two coastal indicators: one for the north Atlantic coast (Mar Cantábrico) with less tourism and one for the Mediterranean, the Andalusian Atlantic and the Canaries coasts. Finally, as we have already commented when describing the summary statistics in Table 5 , there is mean reversion in population growth. Hence, in column 4, we include a second order polynomial of the (logged) population level in 1970. The summary statistics for these controls are provided in the bottom panel of Table 5 .
Focusing on the last, and more complete, specification, the results indicate that public sector jobs do not significantly increase nor decrease employment in the tradable sector. In contrast, the results reported in the second row indicate that one additional job in the public sector creates more than 0.6 jobs in the non-tradable sector. The effect on total employment (third row) is about 1.7 which includes the public job being created and the additional positive effect on private employment. Across the different model specifications, the results do not undergo any major changes. As for population, the results indicate that creating public sector jobs increase the active, the working age and total population, suggesting that taking geographical mobility into account might be important when assessing the local labor market effects of public employment expansions.
As uncovered by the analysis of the determinants of the public sector job expansions in Table 8, the public sector used public job openings to offset negative private employment shocks.
This policy responses will tend to underestimate the (OLS) coefficients presented in Table 9 . On Notes: 1) 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 pooled observations 2) Robust standard errors clustered at the citylevel in parentheses. 3) ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 4) Unemployment rate and share college graduates measured at the beginning of the decade. 5) Coastal dummies includes two dummies: One for the north Atlantic coast (Cantábrico) and one for the the Mediterranean, the Atlantic in Andalusia and the Canaries coasts.
the other hand, however, we have seen that cities that grow more hire more public employees (probably) to provide public services to a larger population. Since growing cities are likely to create more private as well as public jobs, this will tend to over-estimate the effect of public employment on private jobs. Hence, the estimates provided in this section could be either underor over-estimates of the effect of public sector expansions on private employment and population. Thus, we now turn to our TSLS approach to estimate the causal multiplier effects of public sector jobs.
Public employment multipliers: TSLS estimates
We have seen above that capital cities (as opposed to non-capital cities) experienced larger increases in public sector jobs when the Spanish public sector developed in the period 1980-2001. This observation is the basis of the instrumental variables approach that we adopt which consists in using the capital status of a city to instrument for changes in public employment relative to the population level in the base year. Table 10 reports the 2SLS estimates of equation 36 and shares the structure of Table 9 . That is, each row shows the public employment coefficient on an employment or a population outcome. In terms of control variables, the first column corresponds to the specification reported in the last column of Table 9 . This baseline specification includes time dummies, the unemployment rate and the share of college graduates at the beginning of the decade, the tourism variables (the coast indicators and the share of vacation-homes in the city), and the 2nd order polynomial of the (logged) population level in 1970.
Regarding the second stage results, the tradable employment coefficient is not statistically different from zero although the point estimate is larger than its OLS counterpart. Jobs in the non-tradable sector increase in a city when public sector jobs are created. Specifically, a new job in the public sector creates about 1.1 jobs in the non-tradable sector. Considering the direct job created in the public sector, the effect on total employment is about 2.3 (row c). The effects on population are sizable, too. One job in the public sector increases the city's labor force by 2.7 workers (row d) and the working age population by 4.4 (row e). Finally, the coefficient on total population is around 6.4, indicating that city size is very responsive to the creation of public sector jobs (row f ). Note that the 2SLS (positive) estimates of public employment on total employment and on population are larger than their corresponding OLS estimates. This suggests that the latter are downwards biased and confounded by the strong policy responses consisting in offsetting negative shocks in private employment by opening public sector jobs.
The effects of public employment on private employment and on population that we find are relatively large, at least, compared to the results reported for England by Faggio and Overman (2014) . There are, at least, three factors that can rationalize the large size of the multipliers that we estimate. First, as explained above, interregional migration rates have been relatively low in Spain between 1980 and 2001 but, in contrast, intraregional migration rates have been Notes: 1) 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 pooled observations 2) Robust standard errors clustered at the city-level in parentheses. 3) ***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 4) Unemployment rate and share college graduates measured at the beginning of the decade. 5) Coastal dummies includes two dummies: One for the north Atlantic coast (Cantábrico) and one for the the Mediterranean, the Atlantic in Andalusia and the Canaries coasts. 6) Weather includes annual days of frost, hours of sun and rainfall. 7) Regional fixed effects for the 7 NUTS1 Spanish regions. 8) The estimates for active population and working age population not shown in the specification with lagged dependent variables as these outcomes are not available for 1970. For this specification, the F-statistic is not reported as for each outcome it takes a different value 9) Motorways is the decadal contemporaneous increase in the number of motorway rays.
substantial (Bover and Arellano, 2001) . Second, the model simulations indicate that the land supply elasticity is key to determine if, and the extent to which, public employment crowdsin or crowds-out private employment. As can be seen in Figure 3 , the complier cities in our TSLS regressions are relatively small provincial capitals which can be deemed as cities with a rather elastic land supply. Finally, the model simulations indicate that multipliers will be larger when public sector wages are high. In Spain, the public sector wage gap is substantial (Hospido and Moral-Benito, 2014) , and this is especially true in small provincial capitals given that the distribution of public sector wages is more compressed than that of the private sector.
For the estimates in Table 10 to be reliable, the instrument used needs to be both relevant and valid. In terms of relevance, the estimates in Table 8 indicate that, indeed, capital cities at-tracted more public sector jobs. According to the results in the last column, capital cities gained which is very close to 0.016, the estimate obtained in the last specification of Table 8 .
Regarding instrument validity, the identifying assumption is that, conditional on control variables, the capital status of a city is uncorrelated to unobserved shocks in employment and population decadal changes. As explained above, provincial capitals were established in 1833
and, therefore, are clearly pre-determined with respect to our outcome variables. However, capital cities differ from non-capital cities in several respects. Capital cities have a lower unemployment rate (the average unemployment rate -pooling 1981 and 1991-is 16.91 and 20.04 for capital and non-capital cities) and a larger fraction of college graduates (the average share of college graduates -pooling 1981 and 1991-is 9.71 and 5.75 or capital and non-capital cities). As Figure 1 shows, capital cites are also less likely to be on the Mediterranean and Canaries' coasts and, finally, capital cities are larger as can be readily seen in Figure 2 . Although including these controls had a modest impact on the OLS coefficients (see Table 9 ), their exclusion do confound the TSLS estimates. Thus, our identifying assumption is that capital status is uncorrelated to shocks in employment and population changes once we control for initial unemployment, education, location (coast versus inland) and size. Note that these city features are observables that confound our estimates when they are omitted as controls. Hence, there might be city unobservables that are actually confounding our findings. In what follows, we will address a number of threats to identification.
In the US, weather has been an important determinant of city growth with cities in the sun belt performing especially well, see e.g. (Rappaport, 2007) . Thus, in column 2 of Table 10 we include city-level weather controls. Specifically, we consider the city's annual averages in days of frost, hours of sun and rainfall 28 . The results remain unchanged indicating that a correlation between weather and capital status is not confounding our estimates.
As explained above, capital cities are less likely to be on the Mediterranean and Canaries'
coasts. More generally, Figure 1 also reveals that while capitals are evenly distributed across Spain, non-capitals are concentrated in the east and the south-east. Since the east has performed particularly well in the period of study, the results could be biased by the fact that regions performing better have a higher proportion of non-capital cities. Thus, in column 3, we include dummies for the 7 (broad) NUTS1 cities within regions remain largely unchanged and indicate that regional specific trends in employment and population are not confounding our results.
In column 4 we move to city-specific pre-treatment trends in employment and population.
Specifically, we include, as an additional control variable, the lagged dependent variable (1970-1980 and 1980-1990 values for the 1980-1990 and 1990-2001 observations, respectively) . Since the active and the working-age population for 1970 are not available, we can not estimate this specification for rows d) and e). Reassuringly, our estimates do not undergo any significant changes suggesting that our results are not driven by pre-existing city-specific time trends.
Finally, in the period that we study, Spain developed an important motorway network that has been found to affect city growth, see, e.g. (Garcia-López (2012) and Garcia-López et al. (2015)). Since the created network might have provided better connection to capital cities, in column 5 we include, as an additional control variable, the decadal contemporaneous increase in the number of motorway rays in the city 30 . The results suggests that the positive effects that we document from public sector jobs on private employment and population are not capturing higher infrastructure investments in capital cities. Overall, once we account for basic differences across cities in terms of unemployment, education, location (coastal versus non-coastal cities) and size, the results do not seem to be sensitive to a number of robustness check.
We conclude this section by comparing the estimated multipliers with those obtained when simulating the search and matching model in section 3. According to the regressions, one additional public sector job increases private employment by about 1.3 and active population by 2.7.
The corresponding multipliers found in section 3 (Table 2) were about 1.3 and 2.6, respectively.
Admittedly, the multipliers for the tradable sector are less similar although not statistically different from each other. While the multiplier is -0.012 according to the simulated model, the corresponding TSLS (point) estimate is 0.267. All in all, the empirical findings following the two different empirical approaches yield remarkably similar results and, thus, the two approaches cross-check each other.
Do public sector jobs reduce local unemployment?
The regression results obtained above clearly indicate that public sector jobs do increase private employment. However, they also show that population also increases and, thus, the effect on the unemployment rate is not obvious. To assess the implied effects on the unemployment rate by the estimates presented in Table 10 , we take the average Spanish city in 2001 and assume that public employment increases by 50%, which is the policy experiment that we have simulated with the calibrated search and matching model in section 3. The findings are reported in Table   Centre : Castile and Leon, Castile-la Mancha, Extremadura; East: Catalonia, Valencian Community and Balearic Islands; South: Andalusia, Region of Murcia; Canary islands. 30 Number of motorway rays in each city computed using the Mapa General de Carreteras -Ministerio de Fomento from the years 1980, 1990 and 2001. 11. Notes: 1) The new equilibrium is the result of adding to the 2001 mean, the respective multiplier times 14,745 (a 50% increase in public employment starting from 29,489 jobs). The last two columns (shown for the ease of comparability) shows the baseline simulations reported in Table 2 . 2) a are changes expressed in percentage points.
Column 2 of Table 11 reproduces the estimated multipliers reported in the first column of Table 10 . The new equilibrium is the result of adding to the 2001 mean, the respective multiplier times 14,745, which is a 50% increase in public jobs for the average city in 2001. Increasing public employment by 50% increases total employment by 28.9%. At the same time, however, active population grows at a similar rate (28.02%) and, as a result, the unemployment rate experiences a rather limited decrease. In particular, the unemployment rate only decreases from 0.156 to 0.150. These results are, again, very similar to those predicted by the simulations in section 3. In the baseline scenario (Table 2) , increasing public employment by 50% increases total employment and active population by 27.84% and 26,70%, respectively, with the unemployment rate falling from 0.156 to 0.149.
The results presented in Table 11 also allow us to quantify the effects of public employment on the working-age population. As explained above, one important phenomenon occurring in the Spanish labor market in the period that we study is a drastic increase in female labor force participation. Our estimated effects on the active and the working-age city-level populations suggest that this was not the case. Specifically, public sector jobs increase the labor force and the working-age population by a similar proportion and, as a consequence, participation in the labor market remains largely unaltered. All in all, migration (rather than labor-force participation) seem to be the main margin through which local labor markets adjust to public sector jobs expansions.
Summary and final remarks
In this paper we have quantified the impact of public employment on Spanish local labor markets in the long-run, following two different quantitative approaches. In the first one, we have developed a 3-sector (public, tradable and non-tradable) search and matching model embedded within a spatial equilibrium model in the spirit of Beaudry et al. (2012) and Kline and Moretti (2013) . We have characterized the steady state of the model and calibrated it. Then, we have used the model to simulate a policy consisting in expanding public sector employment in a city.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use a calibrated search and matching model to study the effect of a local labor market policy in the context of open cities. Variants of the quantitative approach developed here might be well suited to evaluate both labor market and regional policies in instances in which local unemployment is an important policy target or outcome of interest.
In second empirical approach, we have used regression analysis to estimate public sector job growth on decadal changes (1980-1990 and 1990-2001) We have resorted to an instrumental variables' approach that uses the capital status of cities to instrument for changes in public sector employment.
The two empirical approaches yield qualitatively similar results and, thus, cross-check each other. One additional public sector jobs creates about 1.3 extra jobs in the private sector. However, these new jobs do not translate into a substantial reduction of the local unemployment rate as better labor market conditions attract new workers to the city. Increasing public employment by 50% only reduces unemployment by from 15.6 to about 15%. One important message of this paper is that taking geographical mobility into account can be crucial for properly evaluating the equity and efficiency of regional and local policies, as has been emphasized by Kline and Moretti (2013) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) when assessing the rationale for place-based initiatives.
(W t −U ) = 
B Appendix: The wages equations
To obtain the wage equations 24 and 25 we start using the first order conditions 22 and 23. Next, we solve for J t in 3 and J n in 4 
